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Abstract 
Sensitive company information can leak to unauthorized parties in case employees do not perform 
effective protective measures while using application systems for their day-to-day tasks. To reduce the 
risks for such information leakage incidents, many companies require their employees to follow 
information systems (IS) security policies and promote awareness programs to increase IS security 
awareness. The design of effective IS security awareness approaches is addressed by existing 
research. However, understanding how environmental and organizational factors influence 
organizations individuals’ IS security awareness is limited. Using grounded theory as qualitative 
research approach we collect empirical data from 22 informants. The interview data of company 
outsiders and company insiders is analyzed to identify contextual factors and explain associations 
among them. Our stated propositions help to understand why individuals in one organization are well 
aware of IS security threats and policies, while another organization’s individuals have a lower level 
of IS security awareness. 
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 1 Introduction 
Employees handle sensitive company information in their day-to-day jobs when using application 
systems. When they store or transmit information in an insecure manner, vulnerabilities that can be 
exploited by criminal offenders causing information leaks are created (Willison and Backhouse, 2006). 
While processing sensitive company information users may act with malicious intentions (such as 
information theft, sabotage, or destruction) or they may perform unintentional or accidental actions, 
which create risk to confidential information (Warkentin and Willison, 2009; Loch et al., 1992). An 
example for an unintentionally caused information leakage incident is the loss of detailed personal 
information of 25 million British citizens in the governmental tax agency. In this incident, 40% of the 
British population’s personal information was leaked caused by "junior" staff members sending 
password protected but unencrypted hard disks via a private delivery service (Pfanner, 2007). 
Information leakage incidents can severely impact companies’ market value or result in financial 
losses due to decreased market shares (Acquisti et al., 2006). To reduce the risk of user-caused 
information leaks, most companies define, communicate, and execute IS security policies with the 
objective to promote acceptable user actions and prevent unacceptable actions. 
Assuming that such IS security policies effectively prescribe secure user actions (Siponen, 2000), most 
behavioral information systems (IS) security studies investigate individual factors explaining users’ 
compliance or noncompliance with IS security policies (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; D’Arcy et al., 2009; 
Herath and Rao, 2009; Pahnila et al., 2007; Straub, 1990). Their results suggest that IS security policy 
compliance is anteceded by a variety of different factors. For example, an individual’s natural 
disposition strongly impacts the behavioral intention to comply with IS security policies via 
mechanisms such as neutralization (Siponen and Vance, 2010). Moreover, and in line with other areas 
of IS research, also attitude plays an important role in the formation of a user’s behavioral intentions in 
the IS security context (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). Here, particular attention has been devoted to the 
centrality of security awareness in forming the behavioral intentions to comply with security policies 
(Dinev and Hu, 2007). In order to create or increase security awareness, mechanisms such as trainings 
can be used (Puhakainen, 2006; Puhakainen and Siponen, 2010) and create an important complement 
that is at the discretion of executives responsible for IS security. However, studies on theoretical 
explanations that could help to inform practitioners in their design of mechanisms to increase IS 
security awareness (ISA) have hitherto focused on individual factors. In contrast to that, factors on 
other levels that antecede individuals’ ISA lack extensive investigation. But, as highlighted by Stanton 
et al. (2004), closing this gap between a relevant requirement in practice and the theoretical knowledge 
explaining security behavior in particular settings is important to design meaningful organizational and 
technological interventions. Such knowledge can be used to leverage the effectiveness of security 
trainings or campaigns as well as for the design of technologies preventing information leakage. 
It is this ongoing discourse that our study is intended to be a part of. As such, we go beyond the 
individual level and are seeking to identify contextual factors inside and outside of organizations that 
impact individuals’ ISA. We believe that factors rooted in the organization an individual is part of, or 
the environment both are embedded in, add important discrete context that helps to better understand 
and explain individuals’ ISA (Johns, 2006). In our work we thus address the following research 
question: What are the antecedent environmental and organizational contextual factors that influence 
an employee’s ISA? 
To do so, we are relying on a study design based on the grounded theory method (Corbin and Strauss, 
1990; Urquhart et al., 2010) to stimulate the inductive emergence of theory. Encouraged by Johns 
(2006), we use a set of qualitative interviews to study events of unintentional or accidental information 
leakage in order to identify environmental and organizational contextual factors. The resulting 
contributions will be important to understand which role environmental and organizational context 
play in explaining why individuals in one organization are well aware of IS security threats and 
policies while another organization’s individuals have a lower level of ISA. Ultimately, we argue, this 
 helps to better understand employees’ behavior and how to influence it in order to avoid unintentional 
or accidental actions, which threaten the confidentiality of information in a work setting. 
The remaining parts of this paper are organized as follows: we first review organizational IS security 
literature. We then present the research method used in section three followed by the study’s findings 
in section four. Finally, we conclude by summarizing key findings and implications. 
2 Related work 
To understand IS security behavior in organizations current literature examines a variety of factors. 
Existing studies examine the antecedent factors for IS security management effectiveness (Chang and 
Ho, 2006; Kankanhalli et al., 2003; Goodhue and Straub, 1991), general security practices (Stanton et 
al., 2004), or security behavior in academic settings (Kolkowska, 2011). 
Chang and Ho (2006) examine the influence of organizational factors on the effectiveness of 
implementing an information security management standard. Their results reveal that there is a 
significant impact of various factors, including IT competence of business managers, environment 
uncertainty, industry type, and organization size on the effectiveness of implementing information 
security management. Kankanhalli et al. (2003) study if IS security effectiveness is based on 
organizational factors such as organizational size, top management support, and industry type. They 
find strong top management support positively influences preventive measures and financial 
organizations undertake more deterrent efforts toward security. Their findings in regards to the 
industry type are consistent to the results of Goodhue and Straub (1991). However, existing studies on 
security management effectiveness lack explaining contextual factors from the environmental and 
organizational context influencing employees’ ISA. Stanton et al. (2004) conduct two national survey 
studies and explore “some of the motivational antecedents surrounding the practices of information 
security by end users” (Stanton et al., 2004, p. 1). They report in their study how users’ password 
management and password sharing behavior varies substantially across different industry types. 
Results reveal that organization size and industry type show relations to some key security behaviors 
of users. Employees in larger organizations and employees from the military, financial institutions, 
and telecommunication companies, report better password management practices than employees in 
other organization types. The suggested model helps to measure outcome variables on password 
management, but insights into antecedents to ISA are missing. Kolkowska (2011) studies IS security 
behavior in an academic environment. One of her main finding is that subcultures exist in 
organizations and that group’s value systems predict differences in behavior. Her findings are 
important to understand how to cultivate different security cultures in organizations. However, as she 
indicates findings cannot be generalized beyond an academic environment. 
Present knowledge on environmental and organizational contextual factors influencing IS security 
behavior is limited to explaining security management, general security practices, or behavior in 
academic settings. However, knowledge on antecedents to the theoretical construct ISA is limited, but 
would be important since latest findings highlight ISA as an important determinant of employees’ 
policy-compliant behavioral intentions (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Dinev and Hu, 2007; Liang and Xue, 
2010; Pahnila et al., 2007). Addressing this lack of understanding is pointed out by Bulgurcu et al. 
(2010, p. 543) as essential, because “factors that lead to ISA would be an important contribution to 
academics, since there is a gap in the literature in this direction.” For practitioners interested in 
reducing the risk of information leakage incidents by leveraging the overall security policy-
compliance of employees, a clear understanding of possible factors that increase individuals’ ISA is 
important. With this understanding, better organizational interventions (e.g. trainings, campaigns, 
managerial practices) or technological interventions (e.g. information leakage prevention, violation 
detection) can be designed that successfully change employees’ behaviors in real-world settings 
(Puhakainen and Siponen, 2010). The lack of theoretical insights into antecedents of ISA, the shown 
success of interventions in real-world settings that change security behaviors by increasing ISA, and 
the opportunity to further leverage intervention’s effectiveness, urge us to address this gap. 
 3 Methodology 
To provide initial categories for the building of cumulative theory in this area, we follow an inductive 
theory building strategy to develop a theory for explanation (Gregor, 2006). For the discovery and 
initial building of substantive theories, the literature discusses a broad range of potential research 
strategies and approaches. Among them, the grounded theory approach, originally suggested by Glaser 
and Strauss (1967), has been described as one of the most influential paradigm in the social sciences 
(Denzin, 1997). The different strands of grounded theory – either as a general approach for theory 
emergence or as a more formal conception of extracting knowledge from data – are established 
research approaches in the IS field (Urquhart et al., 2010). For our work, we focus on the more formal 
grounded theory method perspective suggested by Corbin and Strauss (2007). We perform data 
analysis during the data collection and follow a theoretical sampling strategy to decide on analytical 
grounds where to sample from next (Urquhart et al., 2010). This selection process ensures that the 
substantive area addressed is kept similar and that emerging observations by various respondents are 
likely to replicate or extend the emergent theory (Orlikowski, 1993). 
In the effort to collect data which provides in-depth insights into different companies independent of 
industries and organizational context, our research design relies on a phased data collection approach 
(Myers and Newman, 2007; Myers, 2010). To collect industry-independent data first, we designed our 
study to collect data from outside informants in order to find criteria guiding the second phase. The 
second phase aims at interviewing inside key informants that are sampled based on criteria identified 
in the first phase. Inside key informants assess the firm they are employed with. Outside informants 
such as academics, analysts, and consultants assess the firm of interest from an outer perspective 
(Chen et al., 1993). The study of Chen et al. (1993) reveals that the reliability and accuracy of outside 
informants evidences relatively high inter-rater reliability. In their review of 141 studies in the field of 
strategic management and organizational theory they find academics were most reliable, but less 
accurate than analysts, which “may be attributable to [academics’] lack of hands-on, in-depth industry 
knowledge” (Chen et al. 1993, p. 1624).  
Following inductive reasoning for theory building based on real-world data, experienced outsiders and 
inside key informants can be a valuable data source having in-depth industry knowledge and field 
observations about managers’ and employees’ behavior. Bernhard et al. (1984) highlight that 
secondary informants’ retrospective cognition about an external reality cannot be genuine proxies for 
actual behavior. However, we believe to study the sensitive domain of user-caused information leaks 
informants other than actual employees can be a solid base for rich findings. Under the warrant of 
strict confidentiality informants can describe the interplay between context and behavior with a high 
level of accuracy, reliability, and a minimum of socially desirable responses (Trevino, 1992). 
Grounded in recommendations by Seidler (1974), we do not target at representativeness of employees 
in a statistical sense, rather, informants are selected due to knowledge about the investigated issue, 
ability, and willingness to communicate about it (Kumar et al., 1993). 
Building on methodological recommendations for instrument development, data gathering, and data 
analysis in interviews (Lillis, 1999; Schultze and Avital, 2011), we designed and tested a semi-
structured interview protocol. Questions on this protocol were for example: What are the most severe 
information leakage incidents for companies? What is the role of users in such incidents? What are 
systematic similarities and differences for user-caused information leakage incidents? A copy of the 
interview guide is available from the first author on request. 
We recruited outside informants such as security consultants or computer security forensics. Inside 
informants have roles such as chief information security officers or computer security forensics. We 
contacted informants using a global social network for business professionals. The business experts in 
this network are organized in access-restricted expert groups. Access to an expert group is granted by 
a moderator upon request based on the applicant’s social network profile. We chose a total of three of 
these groups-of-interest based on a search query involving information security and information 
 security officer. These search strings are based on the recommendations from a pre-interview with two 
information security consultants. Adequateness of the chosen groups was assessed by reviewing their 
titles, self-descriptions, and mission statements as well as analyzing random member profiles. 
For one group we isolated a sample of 155 information security professionals based on the social 
network’s industry classification “consulting” (self-reported profile setting). Expert profiles were 
assessed individually to contact experts with more than four years security experience only. The 
remaining 113 persons were contacted via the social network’s mail function using the profile of one 
of the authors. Potential informants were asked for a voluntary participation in a telephone interview 
study on security for future information systems. The correspondence ensured anonymity for the data 
analysis and mentioned the purpose of the study was to gain better understanding of the general 
characteristics of information leakage incidents in companies. As an incentive a report for practitioners 
with the study’s results was promised. 16 outsiders volunteered for the telephone interview. Recruiting 
of inside informants was done accordingly. The number of informants, industry assignment, and 
informants’ average years of experience in the IS security field are summarized in Table 1. 
 
 Outsider Insider 
Industry Role  Number of informants 






Diverse  ISC, CF 14 7.3 - - 
Financial  ISC, CISO, CF 2 8.5 2 7.5 
Software/Technology  CISO - - 3 5.0 
Industrial Equipment CISO - - 1 6.0 
Sum: 16  6  
ISC: Information Security Consultant; CF: Computer Forensic; CISO: Chief Information Security Officer 
Table 1. Outside and inside informants recruited for data collection. 
The interviews lasted between 90 and 31 minutes with an average duration of 43 minutes. Interviews 
were tape recorded and transcribed verbatim. Four informants did not agree to tape recording. In these 
cases the interviewing researcher took notes during the interview. The promised report for 
practitioners was requested by all participants and mentioned as main motivation for participation. 
After the interview, the respective transcript was sent to the informant for revision and approval. 
Data collection and data analysis were performed in parallel. Previous interviews were used to guide 
the questions in succeeding interviews. For example, after the first set of eight interviews, clear areas 
of overlap, redundancy, but also conflicts and inconsistencies began to emerge. At this point results 
were summarized and the emerging attributes were constantly used in the subsequent interviews to 
achieve a deeper understanding of the phenomenon (Denison and Mishra, 1995). Based on the analysis 
and initial findings of outsider interviews, insider informants were selected and interviewed. From the 
various responses, the systematic similarities and differences are extracted via a process of open, axial, 
and selective coding (Urquhart et al., 2010; Corbin and Strauss, 2007). For qualitative data analysis 
(bottom-up open, axial, and selective coding) the software tool MAXQDA was used to assign codes to 
citations, develop categories and constructs, and to identify relationships among them. The coding was 
done by the first author and results were reviewed by the other authors as part of the data analysis 
process to improve inter-rater reliability. Theoretical propositions were developed as part of this 
process and checked back against the data once the process had reached theoretical saturation. 
4 Findings 
As part of our data analysis, reoccurring themes of observations, perceptions, and interpretations of 
informants are grouped into two categories of contextual factors: environmental and organizational. 
For each of the two categories three contextual factors emerged from the data analysis (Table 2). 
 
 
 Environmental context Organizational context 
Public expectations Organizational structure 
Regulatory requirements Perception of value of information 
Business partner requirements Communication 
Table 2. Contextual factors influencing employees’ ISA in company settings. 
4.1 Environmental context 
One source of input shaping the behavior of an organization’s individuals is the organizational 
environment. Employees’ decisions are influenced by the structure of the environment, availability of 
environmental information, and by respective meaning employees assign to environmental 
information (Dill, 1958). Originating from the environmental context we find three contextual factors: 
public expectations, regulatory requirements, and business partner requirements. 
4.1.1 Public expectations 
Being asked for the kind of information leakage incidents that are most severe for companies, outside 
and inside informants consistently indicate that maintaining a good public image is a major concern. 
Outsider security consultant: Especially those [incidents], which have a certain impact on 
something. If the public is informed about the loss of data for example. Moreover, in case the 
image is at stake […]. 
The public’s interest in information leakage incidents seems to put pressure on organizations while the 
organizations’ reaction is dynamic and seems to change over time. A vivid description of such 
dynamics is given by one freelancing computer forensic as he describes the increasing demand for his 
services. 
Outsider computer forensic: The whole thing has changed through the press of the last months. 
Our orders really exploded [...] Simply because [the organizations’ managers] are afraid that data is 
being stolen and the main argument was always: ‘We don’t want to be in press. Our competitors 
were in press last week. Please do everything so that this will not happen to us.’ 
To understand which companies perform more actions in regards to IS security than others, informants 
compared different companies and described their observation. 
Outsider security consultant: Companies of course that are on the spot in the market, companies 
that advertise with their brand, have higher interest in good reputation. 
To derive propositions based on these statements, a theoretical anchor can be found in organizational 
theory. Elsbach and Sutton (1992) describe how companies require legitimacy to act on markets. 
Legitimacy is conferred when stakeholders endorse and support an organization’s goals and activities. 
Organizational theory stresses the importance of compliance with public expectations, as organizations 
“will be rewarded for having a legitimate reputation” (Elsbach and Sutton, 1992, p. 700). Murray and 
Vogel (1997, p. 143) highlight that if “public expectations are ignored and social influence is allowed 
to take its own course, political and legislative pressure build, frequently leading to negative 
consequences of the firm.” Companies have to deal with social demands and externally imposed 
expectations to minimize damage to their public image. Stakeholder dissatisfaction builds up when 
corporate practices do not fulfill societal expectations and the gap between company actions and 
stakeholder expectations widens as public trust erodes (Murray and Vogel, 1997). We therefore 
propose: 
Proposition 1: The greater an employee’s perception of information protection as societal 
expectation, the higher the perception of publicized leakage incidents as threat to firm’s image. 
Proposition 2: The greater an employee’s perception of good image as competitive advantage, the 
higher the perception of publicized leakage incidents as threat to firm’s image. 
 4.1.2 Regulatory requirements 
In addition to externally imposed public expectations, organizations face heterogeneous institutional 
regulations (Scott, 1995). Outside and inside informants describe that these regulations influence 
employee’s ISA in companies. For example, a senior security trainer describes his observations in 
regards to different levels of ISA in various companies. 
Outsider security consultant: In case I relate this to sectors, there are sectors with high security 
awareness, possibly due to legal circumstances, for example the financial sector. 
Most informants describe a company’s industry as an important attribute when comparing companies 
in regards to general ISA. However, to identify the reasons for regulatory pressure the scope of laws 
determine applicability. Refining this, one of the interviewees of our study, who graduated in law and 
focuses on legal aspects of information protection, highlights that regulatory requirements are based 
on the type of information being processed in companies rather than on the industry assignment itself. 
Outsider security consultant (focus on legal aspects): I think that simply because of the legal 
requirements there is a higher pressure in the public health sector, especially when sensitive data is 
processed. [This] type of data brings a certain amount of obligation and responsibility. 
Finally, besides the existence of institutional regulations, developing a shared understanding is 
described as contextual factor influencing ISA. 
Outsider security consultant: When I surround a company with sensitive data and develop an 
understanding that generally we have sensitive data within the company. At a bank for example [I 
would have this understanding], but if I work in a manufacturing company, it is rather different. 
Regulations can be seen as institutional factors that codify widely held beliefs and stem from 
government initiatives (D’Aunno et al., 2000). Such environmental regulatory policies promote the 
protection of certain types of company information, for example personal data of customers. Previous 
studies on IS security behavior find industry type as a determining attribute for general IS security 
effectiveness (Chang and Ho, 2006; Goodhue and Straub, 1991; Kankanhalli et al., 2003; Stanton et 
al., 2004). The industry type was mentioned by informants of our study to influence ISA, which is 
consistent with findings of existing literature. Additionally, we find two further underlying attributes. 
First, organizations’ individuals need to develop a shared understanding of the type of information 
they process. Second, organizations’ individuals need to be able to relate this shared understanding of 
information types to existing regulations. Therefore we propose: 
Proposition 3: The greater an employee’s understanding of how regulations apply to the type of 
information being processed, the higher the perception of publicized leakage incidents as a sanction threat. 
4.1.3 Business partner requirements 
In addition to factors discussed above, informants described how business partner requirements 
influence decisions made within organizations. When setting goal attainment for decisions, 
information about customers, suppliers, and competitors is considered by organizations’ individuals 
(Dill, 1958). An informant working at a small software development company with less than 100 
employees explains in which context confidentiality is important. 
Insider small software vendor: Especially in the context of communicating with customers it 
means that sensitive data of some customers need to be encrypted in case the contract requires this. 
We compare the answers to an insider of a large software vendor having more than 10,000 employees. 
This informant confirmed that customer requirements apply to their activities as well. 
Insider large software vendor: The most severe [leakage incident] would be, if customer data 
would be lost, because we provide cloud computing services for our customers. The worst case 
 would be if data of this customer is in the press or somewhere else [...], customers would cancel 
contracts and stop cooperation. Then our business would be over. 
The answers of both insiders imply that contractual agreements with customers depict influencing 
factors to the employees’ understanding for information protection. As we compared statements of 
insiders from different company sizes, we propose: 
Proposition 4: The greater an employee’s understanding of business partner security requirements, 
the higher the perception of publicized leakage incidents as a threat to the business partner base. 
Proposition 5: The impact of employee’s understanding of business partner security requirements on 
the perception of publicized leakage incidents as a threat to the business partner base is independent 
of company size. 
4.2 Organizational context 
Originating from the organizational context we find three contextual factors: organizational structure, 
perception of value of information, and communication. 
4.2.1 Organizational structure 
Interview partners report about large companies having a better control of their information. To reason 
why larger companies have a better control of their information, outside informants describe the 
analysis and definition of business processes as a determining factor. 
Outsider computer forensic: Overall, you could say that large companies are rather sensitive with 
data protection for quite a while. Smaller companies, on the other hand, do not have such a broad 
awareness. Companies, the large ones actually, are often those that have analyzed and defined their 
business processes. Those that have a high degree of maturity, are often the ones that better control 
their data compared to those that do not yet know how exactly a business process works. 
In addition our informant describes how organization structures impact the technical enforcement of 
security policies. 
Outsider computer forensic: A strictly hierarchically structured company, a bank for example, 
adapts its access authorization hierarchically and regulates it strongly. 
The analysis of further interviews refines this observation in that the company size itself does not seem 
to be a determining factor, whereas the structuring of activities in terms of formalization (Pugh et al., 
1969) and existing control mechanisms might impact ISA. 
Outsider security consultant: Certainly, large companies tend to have more regulations and this is 
why the awareness could be higher. However, in reality I believe that does not have such a strong 
impact. This is what I experienced in my projects. Such [lack of ISA] can be found in small as well 
as in large companies. 
Previous studies report that large organizations spend more time and money on security, have more 
security staff, or have necessary expertise (Kankanhalli et al., 2003). Additionally, our analysis reveals 
that the reason why larger companies have a higher level of ISA seems to be consistently explained by 
the degree of formalization of work procedures and number of controls. We therefore propose: 
Proposition 6: The greater organizations’ formalization of work procedures, the more likely 
awareness-increasing security controls are in place. 
4.2.2 Perceptions of value of information 
Employees might value information differently depending on the hierarchical level, type of 
information, and type of organizational structure (Gallagher, 1974). Employees’ perception of the 
value of information is described by various informants as an important aspect. A IS security trainer 
 compares an administrative department performing extensive data analysis with a department with 
minor information processing capabilities. 
Outsider security consultant: [Users in this controlling department are] used to perform very 
intensive and comprehensive data analysis, having a greater insight into business information. They 
are aware of the consequences associated with this data. [Others do not have such insights.] 
Especially this lack of knowledge leads to the fact that the value of information is not known. 
Beyond an understanding of the value of information, another outside informant describes the 
importance of understanding threats that are associated with the usage of information systems. 
Outsider security consultant: In case [the company’s managers] are old fashioned, they see IT as 
a better typewriter. They do not see the associated threats. 
Influence of threat appraisal on security behavior is consistently confirmed in existing IS security 
literature (Liang and Xue, 2010; Pahnila et al., 2007). Additionally we find the perceived value of 
information influences the perceived importance of protective measures and therefore suggest: 
Proposition 7: The greater an employee’s understanding of value of information, the higher the 
perception of the importance of information protection. 
4.2.3 Communication 
A shared organizational understanding about the value of information and the importance of protective 
activities is highlighted by the informants to influence ISA. To achieve a shared understanding, 
communication is required to transport a set of values and norms that define rules or context for 
interaction (Leidner and Kayworth, 2006). Norms have an impact on subsequent behaviors of 
employees and can be either enacted as formal control mechanisms, usually codified in the form of 
rules and procedures, or through peer influence and the social construction of reality. In an 
organizational setting formal and social control approaches set expectations and boundaries of 
appropriate behaviors for organization individuals (O’Reilly and Chatman, 1996). 
IS security policies are a form of codifying and communicating a set of rules to define how employees 
should behave. Informants report that the specification and control of such norms have to be governed 
by management to legitimate these activities. 
Outsider security consultant: The management has to support this, it only works if management 
implements and controls it from the top. Otherwise there is no chance that it works […]. 
Furthermore informants describe that an active communication is required to reach out to employees.  
Outsider security consultant: [Two banks with similar size] have security policies which disallow 
[unencrypted data storage]. But as I perceive it, there is a problem with the communication because 
it is not actively communicated to the employees [in any of the two]. 
In addition to active communication, an insider describes how persuasive argumentation and multiple 
channels for communication are used in his organization. 
Insider security officer: This awareness you can really only create by giving information to the 
employees: newsletters, events, such as group meetings, department meetings […] to inform the 
people: ‘Why are we doing this? We are not doing this to boss you around or because we want to 
control you, but rather we do it because we have agreements with our customers and we have to 
stick to them. Otherwise our business is endangered.’ 
Finally, we find that signaling must be consistent to effectively transport messages. O’Reilly and 
Chatman (1996) describe signaling as a special form of communication in which the transmission 
occurs through behavior. A manager consistently asking certain questions may send messages about 
what is important. Behaving inconsistently with existing norms generates signals of conflict. 
 Outsider security consultant: I have to say in case the management sets an example, it will also 
work for the employees. 
Based on the data analysis in regards to communication as contextual factor we propose: 
Proposition 8: The greater an employee’s perception of IS security communication being supported by 
management, the higher the perception of importance of information protection. 
Proposition 9: The greater an employee’s perception of IS security communication being persuasive, 
the higher the perception of importance of information protection. 
Proposition 10: The lesser an employee’s perception of IS security communication conflicts with other 
signals, the higher the perception of importance of information protection. 
Perception of importance and threats ultimately influences individuals’ ISA: 
Proposition 11: The greater an employee’s perception of importance of information protection, the 
higher an individuals’ ISA. 
Proposition 12: The greater an employee’s perception of environmental context threats, the higher an 
individuals’ ISA. 
5 Conclusion 
This study identifies three contextual factors originating from environmental context and three contextual 
factors originating from organizational context that antecede individuals’ ISA in particular organizational 
settings. A lack of ISA among employees is consistently confirmed in existing literature to increase the risk 
of insecure information processing actions, which could ultimately result in information leaks. 
Acknowledging these previous findings, our developed propositions describe how public expectations and 
requirements originate from environmental context. The identified factors influence employees’ perception 
of information leakage incidents as being a threat. As part of the organizational context the formalization of 
work procedures, employees’ perception of value of information, and communication influence 
individuals’ ISA. Employing theoretical sampling and constant comparison we find that the threat 
perception of lost business partner base is independent of company size. Finally, we find communication 
can be considered as a crucial aspect to transport understanding of values, norms, and threats among 
employees. Specifically, the shared understanding among employees is influenced by the way they 
perceive the role of management and the persuasiveness of communication. 
Our study offers practitioners a wide range of recommendations for designing organizational or 
technological interventions. For example, to increase effectiveness of IS security communication negative 
consequences of publicized leakage incidents on company’s performance should be emphasized. 
Furthermore, communication should be active, persuasive, use various channels, and minimize signals of 
conflict. As for the theoretical implications of our work, the suggested categories and propositions can be 
used as initial stepping stones for the building of cumulative theory improving our understanding of factors 
influencing individuals’ ISA. 
When assessing the implications of our work, certain limitations need to be taken into account carefully. 
One key limitation is the national context the interviews were conducted in. National regulatory 
requirements and the value dimensions of national culture should be considered as they limit generalization 
to other contexts. A second key limitation is the selection and number of inside informants. To circumvent 
socially desired responses to sensitive questions we sampled security officers and forensics asking about 
their observations and opinions of user behavior. However, we acknowledge interviews with actual users 
are required to verify our suggested propositions. 
Future research can be informed by our research to refine or test the propositions to produce a deeper 
understanding of how factors relate to each other. To further extend knowledge, in-depth case studies can 
be conducted to understand why ISA approaches are effective only in particular organizational settings 
while they are not in others. 
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